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Mana and Ideological Integrity 
Solidarity or Just a Flash in the Pan? 
Cindy Zeiher and Josiah Banbury
ON OCTOBER 20, 2014, Aotearoa New Zealand voted into office for a third term, with a convincing margin, the centre-right National Party led by John Key. Earlier in 
2014, politicians from all parties appeared to be meandering to-
wards another uneventful election filled with conservative debate 
and political rhetoric. However, on May 27 a surprising alliance 
was announced between Mana and the Internet Party. Internet-
Mana emerged with great gusto – momentarily challenging the 
terms of political debate between the two major parties’ relative 
policy positions in the lead-up to the election.
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 Initially, the Mana Party attempted to reinvigorate a 
Leftist identity with an injection of class consciousness. The stag-
ing of this political spectacle on the Left was initially embraced, 
by some, as a means of progressing socialism in the country. His-
torically, groups such as the suffragettes in the late nineteenth 
century, or environmental activists more recently, have success-
fully mobilised populist sentiment as a means of initiating last-
ing social transformations – when Mana attempted a similar 
move it failed to convince the public, notwithstanding its popular 
anti-surveillance stance. In order to understand this failure, we 
critically examine the ‘ideological markers’ that both shaped and 
problematised political figures such as Harawira and Dotcom. 
The problematising of these figures, particularly within the me-
dia sphere, obscured how connections could be forged with the 
people. The example of the Mana Movement highlights how radi-
cal and potentially populist projects aiming for substantive social 
transformation can become quickly undone, or even overturned. 
 This paper examines the trajectory of Mana together 
with its odd alliance with the Internet Party. To date, little schol-
arly attention has been given to analysis of Mana’s emergence 
and short history in terms of its attempt to reinvigorate Leftist 
politics. Mana’s ideological tendencies and positioning will be ex-
plored in what follows to remedy this shortcoming. Rather than 
focusing on quantitative considerations, such as voting patterns 
and social-political demographics, this paper draws upon the no-
tion of ‘ideology’ as a way to explore the party politics of the Mana 
and Internet Party alliance. 
Slavoj Žižek and Ideology
Slavoj Žižek is one of today’s most influential political and cultur-
al philosophers. He offers a critical return to ideology – arguing 
that individuals are often unwittingly enslaved by it. He asserts 
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that ideology is an efficient way of regulating social relations as 
it ‘holds’ the individual within systems of control and coercion. 
What is most pertinent about ideology, argues Žižek, is that it en-
tails a great number of presuppositions that underlie the contem-
porary conditions of social and economic life. For example, Žižek 
often interrogates the value and problem of ‘freedom’ as both a 
desirable ideological concept and in terms of the form it might 
take. From this perspective the individual assesses the merit of 
ideology according to its practical efficiency – a structure Žižek 
understands as being self-referential because it problematically 
assumes it is possible to distance oneself from ideology. Žižek 
challenges this assumption by insisting that, on the contrary, 
ideals, desires and aspirations are themselves ideologically pro-
duced through our prior fantasies about how ideology operates. 
 A well-known example offered by Žižek to illustrate 
ideological processes at play concerns the purchasing of a cup 
of Starbucks coffee – where, within the price of a cup of coffee, 
there is a donation made to those who harvest the coffee beans in 
another, less economically developed, country. Here, for the con-
sumer, ideological beliefs and ethics are expressed through the 
materiality of consumption. That is, the fantasy of being ethical 
is upheld through the process of consumerism. The ‘ethical’ act 
of consumption is an ‘ideological fantasy’ that obscures (screens 
off) the persistent systems of material exploitation that underpin 
capitalist production and consumption – obscuring, for instance, 
the fundamental economic asymmetry between the ‘first world’ 
consumer and the ‘third world’ producer (an asymmetry impos-
sible to understand without accounting for historical processes 
of imperialism and colonisation). The consumer can ‘enjoy’ their 
great fortune in being a member of the ‘developed world’ and feel 
ethically validated when doing so. This enjoyment, Žižek argues, 
maintains a compliance with the workings of exploitative and 
oppressive ideological conditions – conditions that covertly main-
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tain the ‘social fantasies’ of consensual economic and political re-
lations.  Consequently, ideology here has the function of filling 
the ‘gap’ between everyday realities (‘I am caught within systems 
of capitalist exploitation and inequality’) and utopian fantasies 
(‘Through engaging in acts of pleasurable consumption I am also 
able to act ethically and contribute to the realisation of a just and 
equitable world’).1 
 Ultimately, however, ideology fails to secure the social 
fantasies it propagates, as it inevitably leaves people dissatisfied 
with, and even antagonistic towards, the very system they strug-
gle to reconcile themselves with. Nevertheless, Žižek argues, 
ideology is a persistent presence within contemporary spectacu-
lar (mediatised) politics precisely because it can be so easily dis-
missed by those who struggle with it. As Matthew Sharpe notes, 
apropos Žižek:
If the term ‘ideology’ has any meaning at all, ideological positions 
are always what people impute to others (for today’s left, the po-
litical right are the dupes of one or another noble lie about natural 
community; for the right, the left are the dupes of well-meaning but 
utopian egalitarianism bound to lead to economic and moral col-
lapse, and so forth). For subjects to believe in an ideology, it must 
have been presented to them, and been accepted, as non-ideological 
… true and right, and what anyone sensible would believe.2 
It is here that Žižek’s critical return to ideology as a place for 
social and political critique offers a position from which to inter-
rogate the Mana Movement and specifically its alliance with Dot-
com’s Internet Party. Today’s critical return to ideology entails 
the activity of breaking down representations and assumptions 
which constitute how people operate in social and political envi-
ronments. Here, ideology can be best understood as being neces-
sary for social, political and institutional cohesion, most nota-
1  Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, London and New York 2002.
2  Matthew Sharpe, Slavoj Žižek, in John Simmons (ed.) From Agamben to Žižek, 
Edinburgh 2011, pp. 224-225.    
117Zeiher & Banbury: Mana
bly within formalisations of capitalism, nationalism or freedom. 
However, the political and intellectual identification with ideol-
ogy fell out of fashion with the ascent of postmodernism. Gen-
erally speaking, proponents of postmodernism argued against 
ideology as that which is necessary to conceptualise important 
political terms and practices. Instead, relativism – that in which 
truth can only be articulated within specific and constructed rela-
tions of engagement and power – was asserted as being central to 
understanding social and political attitudes and practices. Thus, 
ideology was increasingly dismissed or treated with a degree of 
suspicion. 
 This fashionable aversion to ideology as the preferred 
cynical position is critiqued by intellectuals such as Žižek and 
Terry Eagleton. As a way of addressing and reinvigorating Left-
ist issues, Žižek critically returns to the concept, practice and 
refinement of ideology understood as signifying sets of social con-
ditions. Eagleton suggests the ‘end of ideology’ is no more than a 
ploy instigated from the far right in the guise of social democratic 
alliances.3 Ideology has certainly been criticised for being dog-
matic, inflexible and closed. However, Žižek cautions us to keep 
our eyes open to the less visible forces of ideology which operate 
in the guise of, for example, freedom and democracy. Rather than 
denounce ideology, he encourages us to instead critique those 
conditions which structure its misrecognition. 
Mana’s Political Trajectory in New Zealand
The sequence of events leading up to the formation of the Mana 
Party is complex and peppered with controversy. In the beginning 
Minto, Potter and Sykes articulated Mana’s campaign goal as 
‘attracting support from both Māori and general roll voters who 
3  Terry Eagleton, Ideology, London and New York 2007, p. xxi.
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wanted a fair and just Aotearoa, and who supported the develop-
ment of a broad movement of social, economic, and constitutional 
transformation – and not merely a parliamentary political party 
to bring about’.4 It was positioned as being a ‘movement’ as much 
as it was a ‘party’. Mana emerged following Hone Harawira’s de-
parture from the Māori Party, which itself had arisen when the 
prominent MP Tariana Turia acrimoniously broke with the La-
bour Party – a break precipitated by the controversy surrounding 
the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. The Māori Party’s vision 
prioritised manaakitanga (respecting others as equal as or more 
important than oneself), rangatiratanga (self-determination), 
and whanaungatanga (connection to family and community). In 
upholding these values, the Māori Party remained engaged in 
the foreshore and seabed debate, while also becoming involved in 
wider parliamentary issues – becoming a comprehensive parlia-
mentary party in its own right.
 Despite forming around a single issue the Māori Party 
was far from ideologically coherent in its early days. Turia and 
her co-leader Pita Sharples were both conservative Māori activ-
ists who were comfortable in coalition with John Key’s centre-
right National Party in 2008. Harawira, the elected MP for Te 
Tai Tokerau, was not so sanguine about the coalition. He was 
regularly dubbed a ‘firebrand’ by the media because of his public 
questioning of the National government’s economic policies – to 
the discomfort of many within the Māori Party.5 Despite this, 
Harawira was still very much a part of the Māori Party’s de-
cision-making processes in its supportive relationship with the 
National government. 
4  John Minto, Helen Potter & Annette Sykes, Mana, in Jon Johansson and Stephen 
Levine (eds.) Kicking the Tyres, Wellington 2012, p. 153.
5  The Press ‘Harawira Forces Tough Choices on Party’. Accessed 9 November 2015 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/opinion/columnists/colin-espiner/3065554/Harawi-
ra-forces-tough-choices-on-party 
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 The division between Harawira and the Māori Party 
opened spectacularly in late 2010 when Harawira deliberately 
provoked the party into suspending him by publicly criticising 
its right-leaning policies – particularly those to do with employee 
dismissal after 90 days, a rise in GST and the Marine and Coast-
al Area Act 2011.6
 Harawira’s Mana Party, launched on April 30, 2011, 
aimed to champion the causes of the dispossessed. Combining the 
Māori political position of tino rangatiratanga with a reinvigora-
tion of a class-conscious Leftism, Mana attempted to fuse identi-
ty politics with a less fashionable class politics. As Minto, Potter 
and Sykes state, the intention of Mana was to ‘create a political 
movement that was firmly of the Left and which prioritised po-
litical action and community involvement’.7 The result of this ide-
ological combination of class and identity was predictable: they 
became trapped in a deadlock that made it impossible for Mana 
to secure the cohesive identity essential for its survival. Perhaps 
the reason for this political and ideological move stemmed from 
the 1980s, when Labour shifted from being a class-based party 
focussed on collectivity to a ‘post-materialist’ party embracing in-
dividual acquisition. Whereas the 1980s had seen the Left give 
ground on social issues, Mana offered an opportunity to return 
to legitimate former Leftist causes, while also attempting to pro-
mote Māori-infused biculturalism, although this tended not to 
be integral to their media and public campaigns.
 At the same time it is important to consider the tension 
between the conservative and radical factions of the tino rangati-
ratanga movement from which the Mana Party had sprung. Mor-
gan Godfery argues that, despite tensions within the Māori Party 
prior to the 2011 general election, these two factions were able to 
6  Minto, Potter & Sykes, Mana, p. 153.
7  Ibid, p. 152.
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coexist in the party.8 Harawira’s exit, however, upset this coex-
istence, which led to a split between the two factions. Because of 
this, the policies of Mana were, in part, a retaliation against the 
more conservative arm of the Māori Party. Godfery identifies, for 
instance, Mana’s lack of tino rangatiratanga policy initiatives:
Of the party’s policies – the abolition of GST, free breakfasts in 
low decile schools, implementing a financial transactions tax, and 
building 20, 000 new state homes – none can be considered kaupapa 
Māori. The reasons for this seem clear:
The Mana Party was aiming beyond Māori and towards the wider 
working class.
The party believed material issues were more pervasive than cul-
tural issues.
Tino rangatiratanga is not the ideology of young, urban, working 
class Māori.9 
In this way, argues Godfery, Mana benefited from the Māori 
Party’s failure to forge a strong identity politics that could be 
shared between the party’s leaders and its supporters. As Ma-
ria Bargh suggests, when referring to the 2011 general election, 
there should have been more effort to support Māori participa-
tion in the political system from which many voters felt alienat-
ed.10 Interestingly, however, Minto, Potter and Sykes also note 
that most of the Mana Party votes came from Māori electorates, 
with only a third coming from general seats.11
 This brings us to the ideological problem Mana faced: 
that in pitching their campaign and policies towards material 
needs they side lined an explicit appeal to biculturalism. This 
8  Morgan Godfery, The Fragmentation of Māori Politics, in Jon Johansson and 
Stephen Levine (eds.) Kicking the Tyres, Wellington 2012.
9  Ibid, p. 273.
10  Maria Bargh, Māori in Australia and the 2011 Election and Referendum, in Jon 
Johansson and Stephen Levine (eds.) Kicking the Tyres, Wellington 2012.
11  Minto, Potter & Sykes, Mana, p. 154.
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trading of one ideological position for another failed to appeal to 
‘flaxroot’ voters. Mana had to consider those ideological markers 
which appealed to voters across generations – namely those who 
had investment in Māori or bicultural identity, as well as those 
younger voters who rejected this in preference to contemporary 
social media, such as online news feeds, Twitter and Facebook. 
Thus the Mana Party failed to create a national presence among 
voters and even their local appearance in door-to-door and tel-
ephone canvassing was limited.12 The problem facing Mana was 
how to posit a coherent and transparent ideology that appeared 
authentic to potential voters in the general electorates and, at 
the same time, avoided any ‘voter confusion’ that could be caused 
by the perception that Mana and Māori were simply two similar 
Māori parties. This underscores the importance of understand-
ing ideology as having both critical and productive dimensions.
 Žižek suggests that such an insistence on specific ideo-
logical markers, such as freedom and transparency, does not 
necessarily produce authenticity – either within or outside ide-
ology. Instead, it is the fantasy of how freedom and transpar-
ency ought to operate that obfuscates less compatible ideological 
markers, thus ensuring inevitable misrecognition. Again, using 
Žižek’s example of purchasing a cup of coffee at Starbucks, the 
donation contained within the price changes nothing regarding 
labour exploitation and oppression; rather, this kind of ‘ethical 
capitalism’ mystifies the very foundation from which an insist-
ence on ideological coherence might arise. Instead of confronting 
and critiquing capitalism, one clings to the ideology of ethical 
consumption as a way of justifying it. However, a more produc-
tive understanding of Žižek’s return to ideology grapples with 
how it remains a crucial form of contemporary critique – one that 
allows us to grasp the nature of political tranformations. For new 
12  Godfery, The Fragmentation of Māori Politics, p. 275. 
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political parties such as Mana, a way out of this kind of double 
bind might lie in revealing the darkness of one social fantasy, 
that of capitalism, and replacing it with a more ethical one, for 
example, that of a national Leftist class consciousness. It seems 
as though, by not foregrounding a ‘millenial’ inspired bicultur-
alism, Mana missed a poignant opportunity to forge a different 
ideological solidarity. 
 Mana’s ideological intentions became apparent when 
it defined its Leftist position in terms of a commitment to par-
ticipatory justice emanating largely from its ‘social democratic 
vision’.13 Here Mana attempted to engage in a political rhetoric 
that was also intellectually rigorous. It was in this mode that 
Mana was at its strongest, able to engage with a diverse group of 
Leftist factions, boundaries and generations in order to create a 
significant position opposing the National government’s policies, 
thus temporarily bolstering the overall weak position of the Left 
in Aotearoa New Zealand. Mana was, arguably, the first Left par-
ty to align with Māori with a plan to push beyond Māori agendas 
and work politically with non-Māori groups. This was reflected 
in their collectivised, easy-to-read policy slogans: ‘Feed the Kids’, 
‘Jobs for all’, ‘Abolish GST’.14 It was also apparent in Mana’s will-
ingness to work with Labour to oppose the Māori ‘capitalists’ in 
the Māori Party.15 However, because the Labour Party appears 
to have viewed Māori politics as homogeneous, Mana was not ap-
preciated as a counterpoint to the increasing conservatism of the 
Māori Party. Mana sought not only to legitimise political power 
for various collectives (such as the rights of young people and 
workers), it also offered a position for individuals motivated by 
social interests (such as class division and technology). It was 
13  ‘Mana’. Accessed 14 January 2016 http://mana.net.nz/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/
Mana_pamphlet_web.pdf 
14  Minto, Potter & Sykes, Mana, p. 153.
15  Godfery, The Fragmentation of Māori Politics, p. 272.
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in this way that Mana straddled the conjuncture between main-
stream political discourses and attempts to redistribute political 
power, particularly to younger voters; it allowed for the integra-
tion of social structures, such as class, which maintained people’s 
lived realities, with a critique of those political processes which 
were repressive towards particular collectives. 
 Soon after its formation, Mana recorded a respectable, al-
though modest, 1.08% in the 2011 general election, passing other 
established minor parties including ACT and United Future.16 
Despite this, Mana struggled to progress in the polls and was 
largely excluded from mainstream political discussions. More 
significantly, Mana failed to influence those political processes 
that were firmly situated within a third-way, neo-liberal context. 
The best it could manage was to push a welfare-state inspired 
‘Feed the Kids’ Bill. As the 2014 election drew closer Mana looked 
as though it would be able to hold its single parliamentary seat, 
and possibly secure two, but was just as likely to end up outside 
Parliament.
 As it played out, Mana struggled to gain the support of 
the Left because of the perception generated in the media that 
there were ideological contradictions between the members of its 
leadership team. Analysts and pundits were quick to pigeonhole 
key people as either Māori or anti-capitalist activists. However, 
it is probably more accurate to consider them all as possessing 
varying shades of both categories, as well as being influenced by 
traditional Māori conservatism, which maintains traditional dif-
ferences between Māori and Pākehā. During the 1970s, Harawi-
ra was a member of such anti-capitalist Māori based movements 
as Ngā Tamatoa and The Waitangi Action Committee, both of 
which were considered economically revolutionary.17 Mana at-
16  Election Commission. Accessed 14 January 2016 http://www.elections.org.nz/
events/past-events-0/2011-general-election/2011-general-election-official-results 
17  Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, Auckland 1990, p. 220.
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tempted to return certain issues relating to class consciousness 
to a Leftist agenda; its ultimate failure to do so remains per-
plexing. At the time the political scene in Aotearoa New Zealand 
was littered with dirty laundry, as shown in Nicky Hager’s The 
Hollow Men18 and Dirty Politics.19 In contrast to Labour and Na-
tional, Mana had clean hands regarding the social, economic and 
cultural issues troubling many New Zealanders. Why, then, did 
they lose traction so quickly? 
 The visibility of ideological cohesion is for any party a 
crucial element in how it and its leaders present issues and poli-
cies. On the one hand, Mana vehemently reinvigorated Leftist 
ideological convictions as a way of combating what it considered 
the imperialist forces of the National Party. On the other, such 
staunch convictions rendered the party somewhat inaccessible 
to the New Zealand public. For the apolitical, issues that incor-
porate ideological conviction are merely representations which 
are seldom enacted. To not act is an easily assumed and distinc-
tive political stance. It is easy to fall back into a cynical posi-
tion because ideology can, here, be framed as an excuse for lying. 
Furthermore, it is problematic to position cynicism as rational 
critique when, as Peter Sloterdijk claims in his classic Critique 
of Cynical Reason, cynicism is the dominant operating mode for 
contemporary society.20 For Sloterdijk, cynicism arises from dis-
illusionment, stoicism and a failure of trust. These, he argues, 
are infused within peoples’ day-to-day lives – their work, their 
mindsets and in their depersonalisation of social and political is-
sues. The specificity of this depersonalisation (incorrectly) insists 
that political engagement, and thus potential transformation, 
is beyond the realm of ordinary people. Cynicism, he asserts, is 
18  Nicky Hager, The Hollow Men, Nelson 2006. 
19  Nicky Hager, Dirty Politics, Nelson 2014.
20  Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, Minneapolis MN 1987.
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an ‘enlightened false consciousness’.21 It has been suggested we 
live in post-ideological times, where ideology is (or rather, ought 
to be) rendered obsolete through cynicism. Certainly many New 
Zealanders resist the ideological imperative politics discursive-
ly posits and which, as in Mana’s case, is perceived to have the 
potential to undermine mainstream political agendas. Aotearoa 
New Zealand prides itself on appearing ‘progressive’, yet at the 
same time there exists a reluctance to challenge ideological and 
political positions that appear stable and rational. Here New 
Zealanders, on the whole, demonstrate resignation and a certain 
degree of political apathy, a return to unenlightened cynicism, to 
‘the tried and true’ as forms of ‘false consciousness’ which confuse 
self-interest with political rationalism.22 Indeed, such false con-
sciousness, through its refusal to engage anything politically new 
helps in maintaining outdated political identities. Mana chal-
lenged such cynicism by attempting to not only invigorate a new 
political subject, but also to pull the rug from beneath dominant 
ideological structures. 
 It was at this point, when asserting ideological convic-
tion, that the party found itself in a bind. Mana sought to legiti-
mate power through class-based analysis, but without collapsing 
into liberal welfare discourses of social inequality. This meant 
that Mana attempted to keep political consciousness of social 
issues in the spotlight, all the while keeping the party in line 
with an ‘economic justice’ platform involving worker rights and 
oriented towards material needs. As Godfery states: ‘the Mana 
Party’s policy and rhetoric combined to create a picture of a party 
based on class, rather than ethnicity’.23 All political parties must 
at some stage grapple with ideology. As Terry Eagleton poign-
antly states, ‘what persuades men and women to mistake each 
21  Ibid p. xii.
22  Gordon McLaughlan, The Passionless People Revisited, Auckland 2012. 
23  Godfery, The Fragmentation of Māori Politics, p. 273.
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other from time to time for gods or vermin is ideology’.24 Indeed, 
it can be argued that a party constitutes itself as simultaneously 
both God and vermin (often interchangeably or simultaneously) 
through complex sets of ideological conditions that have the po-
tential to obfuscate or mystify the party’s intentions. A good ex-
ample here is the alliance between the Mana Party and Dotcom 
where the God/vermin binary left voters confused as to the au-
thenticity of Mana’s ideological framework. However, new hopes 
and desires are sometimes fully apprehended by specific popula-
tions who are not always cynical about leadership and change. 
Obama-mania and the 2015 appointment of the Greek finance 
minister Yanis Varoufakis attest to a kind of hysteria based on 
the cult of personality manifesting ideologically from material 
struggle and despair. Sanders and Corbyn also manifest as traits 
of spectacular politics within personalised figures. The singular-
ity of a personality can thus become synonymous with a party’s 
ideological conviction – Mana was a good example of such a con-
flation. 
 Annette Sykes provides an example of how focussing on 
one person narrows the public’s vision of a political party. Sykes, 
whose legal advocacy work has centered on Māori empowerment 
and independence, was ranked deputy leader on Mana’s list, but 
was considered within the party more as Tame Iti’s lawyer.25 For 
much of her career Sykes focused on addressing Treaty issues 
and land claims, and she adopted anarchist and socialist posi-
tions as appropriate. Bryce Edwards, lecturer in politics at the 
University of Otago, points out her past political participation 
– alongside Harawira in socialist-leaning Ngā Tamatoa – as well 
as her various anti-capitalist sentiments, as being effective in the 
fight against Pakeha-centric colonial capitalism. This was par-
24  Ibid.
25  New Zealand Hereald, Iti and Tuhoe to Make Waitangi Mark. Accessed July 15 
2016, http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/242924
127Zeiher & Banbury: Mana
ticularly pertinent when Mana applied a Māori nationalistic per-
spective to highlighting the deleterious effects of colonialism.26 In 
contrast to Harawira and Sykes, Sue Bradford and John Minto 
were usually framed as Pakeha socialists and the leaders of the 
more class-based faction within Mana. 
 Although the fragmentation of Mana was most visible 
during its alliance with Dotcom, it became increasingly evident 
that the Mana and Māori Parties were divided along specific 
policy issues. This ideological tension between the two parties 
culminated in the Māori Party aligning with either National or 
Labour. It is here worth examining, in some detail, the reasons 
behind Mana’s decision to join forces with Dotcom as a strategy 
for stronger political leverage. 
Mana’s Alliance with the Internet Party and Surveil-
lance
Following the 2011 by-election, it was becoming apparent that 
Harawira needed more financial and political traction for the 
Mana Party to continue. Stephen Levine offers the following rea-
sons for the Mana-Internet alliance:
In 2014, Harawira accepted the idea that his influence within Par-
liament could be increased at the helm of a larger political force 
– Internet Mana. In order to gain access to considerable financial 
resources – and to what was hoped to be a larger constituency of 
young, techno-savvy voters – Harawira, to the dismay to some of 
his followers, accepted the terms of an alliance with the Internet 
Party. 27
26  Bryce Edwards, The 2010 Bruce Jesson Memorial lecture. Accessed March 8 
2015, http://liberation.typepad.com/liberation/2010/08/the-2010-bruce-jesson-memori-
am-lecture-annette-sykes.html
27  Stephen Levine, Moments of Truth, in Jon Johansson and Stephen Levine (eds.) 
Kicking the Tyres, Wellington 2012, p. 32.
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The alliance with Dotcom certainly signalled a new and compli-
cated ideological direction for Mana, one that was the beginning 
of their undoing. It was during the inception of this alliance that 
Mana’s ideological conviction was placed under greater scrutiny, 
particularly when it came to issues regarding technology and 
surveillance. 
 The Internet Party was founded by Kim Dotcom, a con-
troversial German entrepreneur, three years after the launching 
of Mana (the party registered on May 13, 2014).28 When Dotcom 
launched the Internet Party its ideological position was difficult 
to define. It appeared that Dotcom himself sat on the liberal-
right of mainstream politics and was influenced by classic liber-
alism. This had been apparent when in 2010 he donated $50,000 
to the then-Mayor of Auckland, John Banks – a member of the 
conservative ACT Party.29 Yet despite his links with this high 
profile right-wing libertarian politician, Dotcom’s motivation for 
entering politics appeared to be more driven by the government’s 
raid on his house and his subsequent arrest in 2012 for corporate 
theft and copyright infringement.30 At this time the New Zealand 
government was attempting to form closer ties with the United 
States, ties which brought the country in line with multinational 
interests – consequently Dotcom’s arrest was seen as an outcome 
of these political manoeuvres. His court appearances relating to 
this case started in 2012 and continued through the election year 
of 2014 and after. 
28  Election Commission 2014, Registration of Internet Party and Logo. Accessed 
April 10 2015, http://www.elections.org.nz/news-media/registration-internet-par-
ty-and-logo.
29  Chris Keall, Why Donate $50 000 to John Banks in the First Place? Accessed 
January 14 2016 http://www.nbr.co.nz/opinion/why-donate-50k-john-banks-first-
place-dotcom-camp-explains.
30  This raid was justified and carried out by the US federal police because Dotcom 
was suspected of fraud and copyright infringement. Dotcom’s assets were seized 
and his bank accounts frozen. He was arrested and charged, but later released on 
bail. See Radio New Zealand, Long journey to Dotcom extradition verdict. Accessed 
January 14 2016 http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/292895/long-journey-to-dot-
com-verdict 
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 Dotcom likened himself to anti-surveillance whistle blow-
ers Edward Snowden and Julian Assange, whom he perceived as 
public guardians in maintaining and propagating social ethics. 
Indeed, the inclusion of Laila Harré as a candidate for the In-
ternet Party appeared to grant it a degree of Leftist legitimacy. 
From this anti-surveillance platform, Dotcom proceeded to court 
celebrity while constructing a distinctly odd moral code derived 
from a fusion of neoliberalism and civil libertarianism. In spite of 
appearing as the least politically correct of figures, his insistence 
on transparency had its appeal. He was challenging the authori-
tative power of surveillance. Consequently, it was no surprise 
that the Auckland Town Hall was inundated with concerned 
New Zealanders desirous to hear his ‘Moment of Truth’.31 
 The problem of surveillance is complex and its inter-
face with ideology has the capacity to both neutralise and con-
tradict how we might approach political platforms and policies. 
Most obviously, surveillance incites paranoia (‘When am I being 
watched?’) and is a threat to an individual’s well-being (‘How 
should I behave accordingly?’). The technology and materiality 
utilised in surveillance is constantly changing and unable to be 
understood or regulated by the average person. There is a pas-
sive status the individual is subjected to as a consequence of sur-
veillance – the individual feels exposed to the workings of sur-
veillance and thus self-monitors behaviour, gesture and speech. 
Not only does surveillance harbour a potential for exploitation, 
but also for what can be considered a form of ‘fetishistic voyeur-
ism’ – the enjoyment of watching and of being watched – from 
which ideology marks what are considered socially acceptable 
31  Dotcom’s ‘Moment of Truth’ was revealed nationally on live TV. Dotcom was 
joined by Edward Snowden, Julian Assange and Glenn Greenwald to discuss the 
practice of surveillance in New Zealand. They maintained that New Zealand was 
accessing global data harvesting programs as well as global spying software, which 
Snowden backed up with NSA documents. Dotcom called for stronger transparency 
on intelligence and security issues.
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behaviours and gestures. That is, we act in accordance to how 
we think we ought to act, because we are aware that we could be 
being watched.32 Under the conditions of surveillance the individ-
ual is alienated because submission to its ideological imperative 
to obey entails that the individual is always under a presump-
tion of guilt. Maybe this is what underlay Dotcom’s ideological 
conviction, which, by shifting the focus from his alleged crime 
on to surveillance, enabled him to establish his brand of integ-
rity. This is ironic, because for Dotcom emphasis on surveillance 
ensures that much less attention is being given to the person be-
ing monitored because what is called into question is the ethics 
and morals of surveillance itself. And yet, by his own admission, 
it was his ‘brand’ that Dotcom attributed to the demise of the 
Mana-Internet alliance. 
 The function of surveillance is to create and reproduce an 
unchanging image or representation to others. The justification 
for the institution of surveillance is that individuals may threat-
en to break the rules. Surveillance attempts to remove the impe-
tus to break existing rules of behaviour. And when new rules are 
instigated, the conditions surrounding individual privacy require 
constant (re)negotiation. Dotcom intended his ‘Moment of Truth’ 
to attest to this because he was equating the ‘problem’ of surveil-
lance with the voice of ideological authority. This is both the most 
ideologically accomplished, yet simultaneously the most threat-
ening, position for individuals under capitalism and neoliberal-
ism to assume. 
 Interestingly, and controversially, Žižek shifts the preoc-
cupation with surveillance for the individual when he states: ‘I 
don’t care if we are watched. So what? Let the big Other watch 
me. Maybe he will learn something and be less stupid! This is not 
32  ‘Fetishistic voyeurism’ is used deliberately here to convey that there is a certain 
enjoyment at play in the process and maintenance of surveillance. 
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my problem’.33 Žižek considers the paranoia induced by surveil-
lance to obfuscate the more important and urgent issues to be ad-
dressed. He maintains that we, as individuals, do not necessarily 
change our behaviour when being watched. Rather, what truly 
antagonises the watchers on the other side of the surveillance 
screen is that we apparently do not care our privacy is being 
monitored. While Žižek’s call to dispense with the paranoia sur-
rounding surveillance is compelling, the right to privacy is highly 
valued in Aotearoa New Zealand society, and infringements are 
met with disapproval. That Dotcom’s ‘Moment of Truth’ at Auck-
land’s Town Hall was full in anticipation of his anti-surveillance 
platform attests to this. 
 Investment in not being watched was the platform for 
Dotcom’s political mantra, notwithstanding that one could as-
sume, given his involvement in the political spectacle, that he 
in fact enjoyed it. Given the backdrop to the formation of the 
Internet Party, it came as no surprise that Dotcom’s biggest chal-
lenge would be to remain in control of what he considered could 
be important issues for the media – an ongoing problem for all 
politicians. However, it can be argued Dotcom did not have the 
media on side from the beginning. Of the many media views that 
emerged in response to the inception of the Internet Party the 
dominant narratives reduced social issues to individualised nar-
ratives: Dotcom was either attempting to gain enough political 
power to prevent extradition; or the Internet Party was a grand 
act of retribution directed at the sitting prime minister, John 
Key. Maybe there was some truth in Dotcom’s claims; they soon, 
however, became untruths in the eyes of the electorate and he be-
came isolated, attacked from both sides of the political spectrum. 
It is clear that the effect of Dotcom’s larger-than-life presence 
obscured the political platform of the Mana-Internet Alliance.
33  Slavoj Žižek & Paul Holdengräber, Surveillance and Whistleblowers. Accessed 
April 15 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBBzYG8szmc  
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The Demise of the Mana Party
In April 2014 it became clear the Internet Party and Mana were 
planning to form a political alliance for the upcoming election. 
However, formal discussions between them resulted in promi-
nent figures within Mana stepping away from the movement, the 
highest profile resignation being that of former Green Party MP 
Sue Bradford. The loss of Bradford was damaging for Mana and 
its imminent alliance with the Internet Party. Bradford resigned 
in a far from subtle manner on the day the alliance with Dotcom 
was formalised – she seemed determined to ignite the political 
tinderbox on leaving, arguing: ‘Kim Dotcom is a gamer and it’s a 
big game that he’s playing, and I don’t want to become his pawn… 
I think it’s a big mistake that a party that prided themselves on 
having the least becoming part of the same party as an internet 
mogul’.34  Referring to Dotcom’s support of ACT, Bradford stated: 
‘I find it incredible that a party with the kaupapa Mana has, 
should be considering going into an alliance with Kim Dotcom – a 
man who tried to buy off the right and failed and now he seems 
to have turned to the left to buy the left off’. 35 It seems as though 
the public agreed with Bradford’s sentiments as the ‘two parties 
managed to achieve an even lower level of political credibility 
than the almost negligible amount each possessed on its own’.36 
 The formation of the Internet-Mana coalition attracted a 
high level of media coverage for such a relatively small political 
event. While the Left’s political adversaries had already vilified 
Dotcom and Mana with some success in the media, Bradford’s 
comments boosted their position. Her accusations were repeated 
ad nauseam by media commentators and political opponents, 
34  TV3, Sue Bradford Quits Mana Over Internet Party Deal. Accessed March 10 
2016 http://www.3news.co.nz/politics/sue-bradford-quits-mana-over-internet-party-
deal-2014052712#axzz3mtcX3vEU.
35  Ibid
36  Levine, Moments of Truth, p. 59.
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right up to election day. Colin Craig, leader of the newly cre-
ated Conservative Party, found common ground with Bradford’s 
anti-Dotcom comments and took out a full page advertisement in 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s largest weekend paper, with the head-
line ‘Nice One Sue’.37 The dramatic departure of Bradford, one of 
New Zealand’s most outspoken and principled Left wing activists, 
upset the framing of Internet-Mana – a frame that the party was 
unable to fully reconfigure. The Mana Party began to lose trac-
tion, the most obvious explanation being that those ideals which 
prop up convictions of freedom and transparency – such as hon-
esty, public engagement and choice – were beginning to unravel. 
As Žižek argues, without fantasmatic support ideology and social 
reality conflate into a territory this is indistinguishable from that 
occupied by the cynic. Political ideals need, at least, have some 
chance of being put into practice. It could be argued Bradford had 
reached a political impasse. She simply did not think Mana could 
move forward while in alliance with Dotcom.
 The arguments put forward by those opposed to the 
Internet-Mana merger appeared to misjudge both parties’ ideo-
logical positions. Mana sat, arguably, within a class-based social 
democratic paradigm where capitalism is managed – rather than 
actively resisted or opposed. This attests to their appropriation 
of technology. At the same time it appeared as if Bradford and 
many of those opposed to the coalition genuinely believed Mana 
sat to the Left of social democracy and offered a working alterna-
tive to the capitalist order. This kind of reappropriation or dem-
onstration of the Left, as demonstrated by both Mana and Brad-
ford, is a current global phenomenon which does not escape Žižek 
when he states that the current figure of the Left is akin to ‘an 
apostle who just embodies and delivers a truth – he just goes on 
and on repeating the same message . . . and although it may ap-
37  Stuff NZ, Craig Compliment a Right Game. Accessed January 14 2016 http://
www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/10108261/Craig-compliment-a-Right-game-Bradford 
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pear that nobody follows him, everyone believes him’.38 The issue 
here, for Žižek, is that the Left does not sufficiently provoke its 
own parties’ propagation of ideology. Despite this, once the possi-
bility of such critique arises, as with Bradford, the public and the 
press tend to become suspicious. This suspicion manifests in the 
conditions which struggle with the sometimes frivolous nature of 
political culture. It is crucial for Leftist ideals not to relapse into 
absolutism and acceptance that there are no guarantees to the 
outcome of any political action. 
 Bradford’s dismissal of Dotcom as a neoliberal billion-
aire, and the media coverage following from this, was problemat-
ic because it shifted the focus away from Internet-Mana’s policy 
and towards the Internet Party’s eccentric founder. However, at 
the same time it can be argued Bradford’s resignation benefited 
other politicians such as Colin Craig and enabled the media to 
construct a political scandal. The media ran with the narrative 
that a coalition was formed between Mana and Dotcom, rather 
than Mana and the Internet Party. This suited the media and 
the pundits – as well as Dotcom’s roadshow, which focused on 
his personality at the expense of the Internet Party’s policies.39 
Although this may not have been Dotcom’s intention, his style 
and mode of delivery allowed the media to focus on him rather 
than the party. This created not only cynical public reactions, but 
also raised moral questions – as Dotcom was positioned as  un-
trustworthy. The Mana-Dotcom narrative was quickly embedded 
in the voter’s psyche and Internet-Mana was unable to alter the 
popular perception of being ideologically inadequate. The public’s 
understanding of the coalition became that of a grassroots move-
ment subjected to the whims of a millionaire. The coalition was 
38  Slavoj Žižek, Trouble in Paradise, London 2014, p. 176.
39  There manifests a double-edged sword when the cult of personality becomes the 
focal point for ideology. What tends to occur is that personality obfuscates crucial po-
litical campaigns and platforms but at the same time, the success of these campaigns 
is reliant on the endorsement of a publicly reliable personality.
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not viewed as a coherent political party, but rather as an oppor-
tunistic agreement between a neoliberal millionaire and a move-
ment that had sold its soul to its ideological enemy. Lost in all of 
this were the Internet Party’s policies and principles, which upon 
closer inspection neatly complemented Mana’s. The alliance, it 
seems, was heading for political destitution and needed to reor-
ganise itself and preserve what little consistency it had in the eye 
of the public. 
 Žižek suggests that we ought to be confronted with those 
fantasies which prop up ideology – because the site of the politi-
cal is always, in light of its inconsistencies, a struggle. The urge 
to participate socially and politically is a drive which holds the 
individual in an emancipatory bind, even when a party’s ideologi-
cal foundations are unclear. Similarly, the urge to seem active 
when conditions are unclear can conceal ineffective processes and 
policies. Driven political figures, such as Dotcom and Bradford, 
do not function in a state of political inertia – notwithstanding 
that inertia can be considered a radical position.40 These political 
figures kept policies and social issues alive in the public eye. This 
created an enjoyment of politics as spectacle, as evidenced by Dot-
com’s ‘Moment of Truth’. There was, of course, inevitable disap-
pointment when the ‘truth’ turned out to be no more than what 
the public suspected all along – that they were being watched. 
 The underwhelming ‘Moment of Truth’ exacerbated the 
cynical position of the public and press in relation to Leftist poli-
tics. Nevertheless, there remained the fall back position provided 
by the anti-surveillance platform, which for voters had the ap-
pearance of neutralising tensions between ideological positions 
40  Žižek troubles the modern emancipatory subject when he tells a story of a young 
man who was grappling with whether he ought to fight for his country or stay with 
his ailing mother. The young man told his mother he was going to war, and the army 
that he was staying with his mother. He then left the country to ponder the choice 
he was faced with. This exemplifies for Žižek a radical act because the young man 
resisted those ideological conditions which were already framed for him.
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– namely those between general Leftist politics and Dotcom. The 
Internet Party had developed policies through an online platform 
that was designed to democratise the process of policy formation. 
Although the newly formed party was influenced by social dem-
ocratic ideals, its focus was on technological advancement and 
maintaining privacy. The policies relating to technology included 
universal internet access, digitising schools and investing in the 
digital economy. These fitted neatly with Mana’s principles of 
providing universal welfare, investing in education, and funding 
job creation. Similarly, the Internet Party’s focus on privacy reso-
nated with existing Mana policies; the security policies of both 
were based on realigning foreign policy so that it was less influ-
enced by the USA and multinational corporations. Furthermore, 
cannabis decriminalisation, environmental policies, healthcare 
and criminal justice were giving equal importance in policy sta-
tus for both parties. 
 Jodi Dean critically addresses the intersection of technol-
ogy and political participation as productively collaborative when 
she argues that 
[t]he fantasy of activity or participation is materialised through 
technological fetishism. The fantasy of wholeness relies on and pro-
duces a global [sic] both imaginary and Real. This fantasy prevents 
the emergence of a clear division between friend and enemy.41 
The ideological fantasy for Mana-Internet, wherein ideology 
served to conceal inconsistencies by instituting fantasies of how 
it can best function, merges technology and communication with 
social democracy. This attempt at forming a counter-hegemony 
to neoliberalism instead contributed to damaging the reputation 
of Mana-Internet. Dean maintains that
‘[t]he role of the Party isn’t to inject new knowledge into the work-
ing class. Nor is it to represent the interests of the working class 
41  Jodi Dean, Communicative Capitalism, Cultural Politics 1/1, 2005, pp. 51-52.
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on the terrain of politics. Rather, the function of the Party is to 
hold open a gap in our setting so as to enable a collective desire for 
collectivity’.42 
This kind of reimagining of the political party arguably did not 
manifest for the Mana-Internet alliance, as they collapsed into 
the old Leftist agenda of ‘acting on behalf of’ the people. Interest-
ingly, in the wake of the Mana-Internet alliance failure, Dotcom 
stated to the media: ‘I take full responsibility for this loss tonight 
because the brand – the brand Kim Dotcom – was poison for what 
we were trying to achieve’.43 Here, Dotcom acknowledged the lack 
of common belonging, admitting that the individual commodifi-
cation of his name devalued the reputation of the party.
 Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Internet Party 
was a feminist component that began with its leader Laila Harré 
and continued through its list of candidates. While initially this 
was viewed as a strength that could entice a different cohort of 
voters, it soon became apparent that Dotcom’s personal behav-
iour was unpalatable to those who may have voted on the basis 
of feminist ideals. It appeared that the Internet Party had at-
tempted to encourage voters who were primarily concerned with 
gender-based issues at the expense of its solid base of young, 
technologically minded males. The effort here to be both repre-
sentative of a political party and to portray its political coherence 
inevitably failed because this trajectory was similar to that of 
most other parties, namely of being an apologist for the party’s 
ideological shortcomings and inconsistencies. Such failures man-
ifested with the Mana-Internet alliance when it dispensed with 
class analysis and fell back on the liberal Left emblems of indi-
vidualism, capacity and agency – as evidenced by Dotcom postur-
42  Jodi Dean, Crowds and Party, London and New York 2016, p.5.
43  New York Times, New Zealand’s Ruling National Party is Re-Elected. Accessed 
15th July 2016 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/world/asia/new-zealands-ruling-
national-party-is-re-elected.html 
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ing as a remarkable political figure on the level of Snowden and 
Assange. Although the reaction against Dotcom was not Mana-
Internet’s intention, what eventuated was a typical neo-liberal 
gesture: the cult of personality eclipsed the potential for pitching 
progressive policies.
 The dreary decomposition of a party is one the public has 
become used to and which, in part, accounts for the political apa-
thy pervasive among New Zealanders – as attested to by poor 
voting turnouts and declining political participation. It would 
seem Laila Harré was a force to be reckoned with, a feminist, 
a practising lawyer with a background in trade unionism, and 
a commitment to the voices of young people and the otherwise 
disenfranchised. On the face of it, this should have had more 
appeal to at least some politically minded New Zealanders, not-
withstanding that such political mindfulness is often bound up 
with superficial notions of political correctness. However, follow-
ing the Mana-Internet’s failure to secure a parliamentary seat 
the party was dissolved on the 19th December, 2014.44
What Went Wrong with Internet-Mana? 
The New Zealand Left had seemed on the brink of being reinvig-
orated, yet between 2011 and 2014 the Mana Party was barely 
able to send a ripple through the governing neoliberal ideologi-
cal conditions of Aotearoa New Zealand politics. Although an im-
pact was made at the time of the Internet-Mana coalition, the 
ultimate effect of this was to entrench the existing order rather 
than challenge it. While it could be argued Harré did not take 
the party far enough, the public’s perception of Dotcom’s ongo-
ing legal issues meant the Internet Party could no longer be part 
of the Left’s future. Nevertheless, the Internet-Mana coalition 
44  Levine, Moments of Truth, p. 69
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was more than just a political experiment, as it sought, through 
a technological conduit, to address and respond to some of the 
problems of late capitalism – by deliberately targeting young, 
technologically-minded voters. As the corrosiveness of capitalism 
intensifies, a space is created to think of alternatives in which 
technology might play a pivotal role in processes of future so-
cial transformation. Mark Fisher contends that an alternative 
discursive space outside capitalism is difficult to conceive when 
we continue to appropriate the current state of capitalism as the 
dominant ideology. 45
 One major problem with ideology is the difficulty of 
knowing where we are located in relation to it. We cannot be 
sure how our ideologies are perceived by others, if at all – es-
pecially within the confines of the political spectacle propagated 
by the media. The question arises: is it possible to engage with 
mainstream politics without becoming interpellated by the exist-
ing ideology? If so, how is this to be achieved? This is a question 
the Aotearoa New Zealand Left has always struggled with. Yet 
it must continue this struggle before political mobilisation, let 
alone transformation, can occur. Aotearoa New Zealand has a 
credible history of active political participation resulting in suc-
cessful social democratic movements, perhaps because of its small 
population and relative wealth. It is, by contrast, unfortunate 
that the popularity achieved by Syriza in Greece and Podemos 
in Spain was triggered by economic collapse, which in turn had 
been precipitated by the fiscal ineptitude and corruption of their 
previous ‘socialist’ governments and exacerbated by inexcusably 
risky lending by global bankers. It is interesting that Sanders 
and Corbyn’s recent political campaigns have followed a trajec-
tory in which the individual form of the political eclipses crisis 
45  Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism, Ropley 2009. 
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and collectivity. Perhaps, therefore, the goal of the Left should 
be to illuminate the ideological farce that is mainstream politics, 
whose parameters are today so narrow that demanding change 
in terms of ideological purity fails to challenge existing norms. 
Just as protest can strengthen the illusion of democracy by pro-
viding the perception of a dissenting voice, the strength of politi-
cal parties to the left of neoliberal ideologies helps to legitimise 
mainstream political agendas. Arguably, through a commitment 
to class consciousness, Mana retained ideological integrity dur-
ing its formative years, notwithstanding that even then it was 
ridiculed for propagating a combination of socialist and cultural 
ideological imperatives. 
 Was the Mana Party more than a flash in the pan? While 
Mana offered a political alternative to institutional neoliberal-
ism, it never posed a significant threat to the establishment and 
romanticising Mana’s impact during its pre-Internet Party era is 
problematic. However, Mana’s inability to disturb Aotearoa New 
Zealand politics prior to the coalition and its failure at the 2014 
election should not be considered mistakes. Instead, Mana, and 
those situated on the Left, might ponder whether mainstream 
politics is in fact the right place for attempting ideological purity. 
There is a tendency for anti-capitalist activists to claim purity 
in order to project legitimacy. They are, however, operating in a 
system in which they will never be considered legitimate. This 
seems the case for Mana-Internet where, interestingly, the al-
liance precipitated an unexpected effect: to ‘persuade potential 
National-leaning non-voters to vote’.46 Given this current politi-
cal context, it is tempting to conclude that popular perception 
regards voting for the right as a rational acceptance of a ‘lesser 
evil’, and that the Left are out-of-touch utopians enjoying the 
benefits of capitalism – albeit reluctantly or cynically. 
46  Levine, Moments of Truth, p. 79.
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 Michael Taylor argues that the current market economy 
is dehumanising and elevates anxiety and fear of alternative so-
cial and economic structures.47 If activists of both the Left and 
Right fail to undertake the necessary critique of capitalism, then 
ideology is reduced to obfuscating the bigger questions of how so-
cial transformation could be envisioned and possibly achieved. A 
critical return to ideology is important in the Aotearoa New Zea-
land political context, not least because it provides a rejoinder to 
the concept of neoliberalism. 
 Resistance to neoliberalism, it can be argued, was Mana’s 
guiding ideology – in that it provided a persuasive framework 
in which to configure contemporary power and social relations. 
Foregrounding the problem of neoliberalism is not merely a guise 
for excusing the failures of capitalism, it also, ironically, provides 
an impetus both for critique and for thinking alternative politi-
cal and social structures. Mana undertook a great challenge in 
attempting to connect with the people – it sought to critique the 
existing ideological system and redistribute power relations, all 
the while operating under the very ideological conditions that 
oppressed these processes. Seen this way, Mana was more than a 
mere flash in the pan: it existed, and in part still does, as a trans-
formative social movement that attempts to dislodge the capital-
ist grip by struggling to push neoliberalism into crisis. The Mana 
Party, for better or worse, grappled with the malaise of neolib-
eralism and attempted to position itself as an opponent to those 
who perpetuate class divisions. 
47  Michael Taylor, Rationality and the Ideology of Disconnection, Cambridge 2006.
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